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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent
vs.

CALVIN GEORGE SMITH, JR.,

Case No. 19089

Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Calvin George Smith, Jr., appeals from
a conviction and judgment of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of
the First Degree, and Theft, a felony of the Second Degree, in
Lhe Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Calvin George Smith, Jr., was charged
Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the First Degree, in
·iolation of Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202, Title 76, Chapter
o Section 203(1), and Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302 Utah
· 0

de Annotated (1953 as amended) and Theft, a felony of the

3econd Degree, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 2, Section
'0:', Title 76, Chapter 3, Section 203 (2), and Title 76, Chapter
Section 404 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

He was

convicted as charged in a jury trial and was sentenced to
incarceration at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate
term as provided by law respectfully.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction for Aggravatej
Burglary and Theft and the judgment rendered below and/or to
the case remanded to the Third Judicial District for a new tria:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 1, 1981, Alma G. Winn was the victim of an
Aggravated Robbery and a Theft.

Mr. Winn was accosted during

the evening hours as he exited his vehicle and attempted to
walk from his vehicle through his garage and into his home.
Winn was robbed at gun point by two assailants
At trial,

(T.6-10).

the prosectuion introduced the testimony of

two witnesses who both implicated the appellant in the commiss·
of this offense.

One witness, Jay Sanchez, received complete

immunity for both this first degree felony (T. 22) as well as
thirty to forty other first degree felonies

(T. 63).

The otl-ier

witness who implicated the appellant, Edwin Xitchell, was a
co-defendant up until the evening immediately preceding the
commencement of the trial (T.98).

At that late date, '.lr.

Mitchell struck a deal with the prosecution and agreed to
testify against the appellant in return for being permitted '
plead to the lesser charge of robberv (T.09J.

2

On

stren·:"

these witnesses, both of whom had a motive to lie, the
0 prellant

was convicted by a jury.

During closing arguments, defense counsel for the
appellant pointed out for the jury that a reasonable doubt
could arise from the absence or a lack of evidence.

Specifi-

cally, defense counsel pointed to the fact that two witnesses
had not been called to testify on behalf of the State.

At

that point, the Court interrupted counsel and instructed the
iury to disregard defense counsel's statements and further
instructed the jury that the defendant had just as much right
as the State to call the two "missing" witnesses to the stand.
";he appellant moved for a new trial on the basis tha·t the Court's
comment infringed on the appellant's right not to incriminate
himself and not to present evidence.
trial was denied.

The motion for a new

(See closing argument transcript pp.35-36.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE STATE TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO ANY OFFENSE.
The jury found the appellant guilty of aggravated robbery,
1

first degree felony and theft, a second degree felony.

The

evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support the
irrr:."

s verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The victim of the robbery was not able to identify his
-3-

assailants.

He testified that it was dark in the garage where

the robbery took place (T.10-11) and that both men had black
silk stocking caps over their heads (T.6).

The only evidence

linking the appellant to the robbery was testimony from two
individuals who had also been arrested for the same robbery.
One of the witnesses was granted immunity for the robbery in
return for his testimony against the appellant (T.63).

The

second witness was given a "deal," allowed to plead guilty to
the lesser charge of robbery, in exchange for his testimony
(T.99).

Both of these witnesses had strong motives to lie.

appellant took

The

the stand in his own behalf and testified that

on the night in question he and his co-defendants spent the
night with his father and step-mother (T.192).

He testified

that Mr. Fernandez left at approximately 4:00 a.m. on January
1st (T.199), but the appellant remained at his father's house
until late that afternoon (T. 203).

This testimony was corrobor·

ated by Carol Smith, the appellant's step-mother (T.151-154).
physical evidence was presented which tied the appellant to the
robbery nor was there any evidence presented to corroborate t1e
testimony of the state's witnesses.
It is well settled that a reviewing court has the authoc
to reveiw a conviction based upon sufficiency of the evidence
The standard for review was clearly stated in State v. Wilson.
565 P.2d 66,68 (1977):
In order for the defendant to successfullv
challenge and overturn a verdict on the ·
ground of insufficiency of the evidence,
-4-

it must appear that upon viewing the
evidence, reasonable minds must necessarily
entertain a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime.
Two conflicting versions of where the appellant was on the
night of the robbery were presented at trial.

One version was

presented by two individuals who both had strong motives to
lie.

The second version was presented by the appellant and by

his step-mother.

Both the appellant and his step-mother testified

that they did not have a close relationship (T.161,192-93) and
therefore,

the step-mother was the only witness who really had

no personal stake in the outcome and no reason to lie.

On a

1978 manslaughter case, State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 419 (Utah
1978), this court stated:
[A]n accused is presumed to be innocent
until his guilt is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Consequently, if there
is any reasonable view of the credible
evidence which is reconcilable with the
defendant's innocence, it would naturally
flow that there would be reasonable doubt
as to his guilt.
Ample evidence was presented at trial to indicate that the
appellant was at home with his family on the night that the
robbery occurred.

This evidence was refuted only by two individ-

:ials with strong motives to lie.

There must be reasonable doubt

as to which of the witnesses' stories was true and, therefore,
"here must be reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the appellant.
'.n light of this doubt,

the verdict cannot stand.

-5-

POINT II
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE COURT TO
COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE DURING DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S CLOSING ARGUMENT.
During the closing argument by counsel for the appellant,
the following exchange took place:
MR. BUDGEN: Why does he--you know, why
do these guys use Jay Sanchez?
All he does is supply the gun.
Isn't that
interesting? Do you honestly believe that that
is all that Jay Sanchez did in these cases?
This case? Do you think all he aid was supply
a gun, that that was it, that he was just along
for his good companionship beyond that?
Jay Sanchez planned these things.
They gave
immunity to the bad guy.
The bad guy.
That is
who they gave immunity to.
What else does he tell us about the gun?
He always had it handy, he kept it at his cousin,
Dickie Carrillo's house.
Dickie Carrillo, who we
know he did another robbery with.
We know that.
He can't deny that because Dickie is caught with
him and he tells the authorities that at that time
Dickie always keeps his gun.
Well, I wonder if Dickie Carrillo wasn't at
the Winn robbery.
I wonder if Dickie Carrillo
wasn't there with a gun, too, and where was Dickie
Carrillo? Whose burden of proof is it?
It's Mr. Sol tis' s burden of proof and evidence
can arise not from what is actually presented, but
a reasonable doubt can always exist with respect to
what is never presented.
Where is Dickie Carrillo? Where is Shawna
Johnson? Where are these witnesses? The State
never produced those witnesses.
THE COURT:
I am going to te 11 the jury you
had as much right to bring them in as anybody and
they were not necessary, and the State did not
have any requirement to bring them into this case
regarding as to other matters.
And the jury wi 11
disregard what Counsel said, where is Shawna
,
Johnson and Dickie Carrillo, because the State hac
no burden as relates to them in this case and the

-6-

defendant had all of the rights of the State
to bring them in.
MR. BUDGEN: May I proceed, your Honor?
THE COURT: Now, let's proceed and keep
within our rules.
(Closing argument T.35-36.)

The court's comment on the evidence

and refusal to allow defense counsel to comment on the absent
. ,itnesses was reversible error on a number of separate grounds.
A.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 12
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION FORBID COMMENT
ON THE ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN
SILENT AND NOT INCRIMINATE ONESELF.

It has been well settled since the decision in Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), that comment on a defendant's
decision not to take the stand and hence to remain silent is
reversible error.

In Griffin, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked

to rule on the constitutionality of a California rule allowing
comment on the fact that a defendant had not testified.
finding the rule unconstitutional, the court stated:
[C]omment on the refusal to testify is
a remmant of the "inquisitorial system
of criminal justice," Murph5 v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,5 ,12 L.Ed.
2d 678, 681, 84 S.Ct. 1594, which the
Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a
penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege.
It cuts down on the privilege by making
its assertion costly . . . . We . . . hold
that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct
application to the Federal Government,
and in its bearing on the States by
reason of the Fourteenth Amendment,
forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or
instructions by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt.
1t

614-15.
-7-

In

The Utah Supreme Court has also held prosecutorial
on the evidence reversible error.

In State v. Eaton, 569 p

1114 (Utah 1977), the proseuctor, in his closing argument,

SiJ'

that "only [the] government witness and defendant 'really kno,1s
what took place in that house'
u S ?.

I II

.

Id. at 114.

and 'What does the defendant tel

The prosecutor also remarked that they

'"never heard one shread of evidence from the defendant' in suppo:.
of defendant's contention.

Id.

This court held that

those remarks constituted reversible error despite the fact tha:
the prosecutor did not directly comment on the defendant's
to testify.

The court stated that the prosecutor's remarks weu
. but a thinly disguised attempt to
do indirectly what the prosecutor knew
could not properly be done directly:
that is, to comment on the fact that the
defendant had chosen not to take the
witness stand; and to persuade the jury
to draw inferences as to his guilt
because of his exercise of that constitutional privilege.

Id. at 1116.
In a more recent case, State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326,
(Utah 1980), this court said:
constitutional right,

"[W]hen a person invokes his

the prosecution should not comment the:-e···

nor so use it in any way chat wi 11 tend to impair or des tro:·
privilege."
In the present case, as an offshoot of the defendJnt'"
constitutional right to remain silent, a decision was made nc'
to use particular witnesses.

The court erred in commenting

this decision and the comment clearlv tended to i:r.pair tC--.e

-8-

right not to produce the witnesses.
B.

EVEN IF IT IS FOUND THAT THE COURT'S
COMMENT DID NOT VIOLATE THE APPELLANT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
THE COMMENT DID IMPERMISSIBLY SHIFT '
THE BURDEN OF PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE
TO THE APPELLANT IN THE EYES OF THE
JURY.

It is a well established tenet that it is the burden of
the prosecution to prove every element of the offense charged.
This court clearly stated in State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.Zd 1120,
1122 (Utah 1977), "The entry of a plea of not guilty places upon
the State the burden of proving every element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt."

The defense has no burden of proof

and no burden of production of evidence.

"The ultimate burden of

?roving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains
on the state, whether defendant offers any evidence in an effort
•_o prove affirmative defenses or not."
694, 695 (Utah 1980).

State v. Torres, 619 P.2d

The comment of the court made it appear

to the jury that the appellant had a duty to call witnesses.

From

appellant's failure to call these witnesses then the inference
t:1at their testimony would have been harmful to the appellant
·.1as clear.

As the appellant had no burden to produce evidence,

•he inference that he should have called the mentioned witnsses
1ich must be drawn from the court's comment was clearly prejudi-

1

and reversible error.

-9-

POINT III
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE COURT TO
REFUSE TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO COMMENT
IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT ON THE ABSENT
WITNESSES.
A recent Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Potter, 627
P.2d 74,78 (1981) stated:

"The trial court has a duty to

instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case
Encompassed in this duty is the right of the defendant to have
his theory of the case presented to the jury in
understandable way."

a

clear and

See also State v. Stone, 629 P. 2d 442 (Ur;·

1981); State v. Brown, 607 P. 2d 261 (Utah 1980); State v. Eagle
611 P. 2d 1211 (Utah 1980).

By refusing to allow the appellant''

counsel to comment on the missing witnesses, the court effecti•:e:
prevented the defense counsel from presenting the defense theor
of the case to the jury.
It was obvious from the testimony that the defense theoc
of this case relied heavily on the appellant's ability and the
likelihood that two other individuals, the missing witnesses,
were the actual participants in the robbery.

The court would

not allow defense counsel to present this theory.
The requirements to allow comment on missing witnesses
were well articulated in United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d
(7th Cir. 1976).
(1)

qo·

The requirements mentioned in that case i-c:

that the absent witness is particularly within the other

party's power to produce; and (2) that the testimon; of the
-10-

would elucidate issues in the case and not be merely
Both of these requirements were met in the present
;case.
The first requirement, according to the Mahone case,
either when the· witness is physically available only to the
opposing party or when "the witness has a relationship with the
opposing party 'that would in a pragmatic sense make his testimony
unavailable to the opposing party regardless of physical availability.'"

Id. at 926.

The situation in the case at bar

falls within the second alternative.

Since the prupose of having

Carrillo and Johnson testify would have been to clear the
appellant by incriminating themselves, it is not reasonable to
believe that either missing witness would have testified for the
defense.

The second Mahone requirement is also met in this case.

The testimony of the absent witnesses would not have been cumulative
And would have elucidated some critical issues in this case.
Because the facts meet the requirements established by
United States v. Mahone, supra, the defense counsel should have
'ieen allowed to comment on the absent witnesses during this
closing argument.

The failure to allow such comment prevented

defense from effectively presenting

its theory of the case

hich is a right long recognized by Utah courts.

The court's

to allow comment on the missing witnesses was clearly
·

to the appellant and must therefore be considered
··vcrsible error.

-11-

CONCLUSION
The evidence presented at trial was not sufficient [,;
sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
aggravated robbery and theft.

Not only was the evidence prese:

contradictory and inconclusive but there was also ample evidenc,
presented to give rise to a reasonable doubt under the standar:
articulated in State v. John, supra.

The conviction therefore,

cannot stand and must be reversed.
The comment made by the court during the.closing argumen:
of defense counsel was reversible error as it violated the
appellant's right against self-incrimination and it shifted the
burden of production of evidence to the appellant in the eyes o:
the jury.

The court's refusal to allow defense counsel to colllI:lec

upon the missing witnesses was error as it prevented the defense
from adequately presenting its theory of the case.
In State v. Eaton,

569 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah 1977), this

court stated:
Consistent with the nature of criminal
proceedings and the protections accorded
those accused of crime under our law,
including the presumption of innocence
and the burden of the state to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, we believe that, on appeal, when
there is a reasonable doubt as to whether
the error below was prejudicial, that doubt
should be resolved in favor of the defendant,
This is especially true where the error
is one which transgresses against the exercise
of a constitutional right.
Consequentlv, the
rule which we have numerous times stated is
that if the error is such as to justifv a
belief that it had a substantial adverse
-12-

effect upon the defendant's right to a
fair trial, in that there is a reasonable
likelihood that in its absence there may
have been a different result, then the
error should not be regarded as harmless,
and conversely, if the error is such that
is it clear beyond a resonable doubt that
it was harmless in that the result would
have been the same, then the error should
not be deemed prejudicial and warrant
granting a new trial.
In the instant case, the error was prejudicial and the
court's comment clearly had a substantial adverse effect upon
the defendant's right to a fair trial.

Because of this, the

conviction cannot stand.
DATED this

June, 1984.
Respectfully subn:itted,
/

/

84111

DELIVERED two copies of the foreging Brief of
to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this _L1__ day of

!1
l
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